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CASENOTE
ZONING-Population Control in Metropolitan AreasMunicipal Ordinances Limiting the Number of Building Permits for the Purpose of Restricting Population Growth Held
Unconstitutional Infringement on the Right to Travel, Where
There is No Shortage of Municipal Facilities to Serve the New
Residents. ConstructionIndustry Association of Sonoma County v.
City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
The city council of Petaluma, California passed a series of municipal zoning ordinances to provide the city with a phased growth
plan' designed to limit new housing units to 500 each year, 2 approximately one-third to one-half of the demographic and market demand of the 1970-1971 period. 3 To implement its plan and limit city
population the city council created an "urban extension line,"'
establishing a municipal boundary beyond which the city would
neither annex land nor extend municipal facilities. 5 The Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County assailed the Petaluma
Plan alleging that it penalized the right to travel without furthering
any compelling state interest. Petaluma contended that inadequate
sewage and water facilities made it impossible to absorb more people.' The District Court for the Northern District of California found
that the city was able to provide such facilities' and held that the
1. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D.
Cal. 1974).
2. Brief for Plaintiff at 1.
3. 375 F. Supp. at 576.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 576-78. An absolute population level was set for the city by
using a variety of techniques. Once the area of the city was determined by
the "urban extension line," the city council promulgated density restrictions affecting the land within the municipality. As a result, under the
existing ordinances, the city could grow to a certain size and no larger.
Other more indirect methods were used by Petaluma. For example, Petaluma contracted with the Sonoma County Water Agency to take 9.8 million
gallons of water per day through 1990. The court found that "this flow is
[only] sufficient for a population of 55,000." Id.at 577-78.
6. Id.at 581-83.
7. Id.at 578.
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ordinances unconstitutionally restricted the right to travel of those
wishing to migrate into the city.8
The right to travel was first explicitly recognized in this country
in the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the Articles
of Confederation, 9 but was omitted from the Constitution.' However, in comparing the privilges and immunities clause of the Articles of Confederation with that of the Constitution, the United
States Supreme Court has said that "[tihere can be but little
question that the purpose of both these [two] provisions is the
same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same
in each.""
The first significant case which dealt with the right to migrate
2 Defendant's boat was confisand settle was Corfield v. Coryell.1
cated when he violated a New Jersey statute which forbade nonresidents from gathering oysters in state waters. 3 The court entered
judgment for the defendant and struck down the statute. The court
found that the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution
embraced "[tihe right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or
to reside in any other state . . . [and that the right is] clearly
embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be

fundamental ....

,,14

In Truax v. Raich," the United States Supreme Court indirectly
8. Id. at 581.
9. Articles of Confederation art. IV, § 2 provides that "[t]he people
of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
[state] . . . *"
10. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
11. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1872). Therefore,
it appears that quite a strong argument can be made in support of the
proposition that the right to travel is included in the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution. Cf. Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U.S. 37 (1920), where the Court found that "[o]ne of the rights intended to be secured by [article IV, section 2 of the Constitution] . . . is
that-a citizen of one State may remove to and carry on business in another
[State] . . . ." Id. at 56. It does not seem unreasonable to interpret the
words "remove to" to mean migrate rather than just travel.
12. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
13. Id. at 548.
14. - Id. at 552. This language was quoted with approval by a unanimous
Court more than a century later in Hess v. Paloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355-56
(1927).
15. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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indicated that the right to migrate and settle is a constitutionally
protected right of a United States citizen. Here, an Arizona statute
required all those employing more than five persons to hire a work
force comprised of eighty percent native born Americans. Defendant
alien was admitted to the United States pursuant to federal law. He
worked for the plaintiff, an employer of over five persons. The Supreme Court found that defendant "was . . . admitted [to the
United States], with the privilege of entering and abiding in the
United States, and hence of entering and abiding in any State in
the Union."'"
One can conclude that if an alien possesses the right to migrate
into and reside in the state of his choice, a fortiori, a citizen must
possess a right equally as broad. This idea was expressed most
clearly by Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Edwards
v. California.7 Citing Traux, he concluded that if the alien's rights
were greater than those of a citizen then "[tihe world is even more
upside down than I had supposed it to be. . . ."" While the rhetorical question posed by Mr. Justice Jackson combined with the holding in Traux is persuasive, there is no clear holding that grants each
citizen of the United States the constitutional right to migrate and
settle in the state of his choice.
In Edwards v. California,9 a California resident, contrary to California law,2 transported his indigent brother-in-law from Texas into
California. The Supreme Court struck down the statute as imposing
an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce, 2 ' finding
that the intent of the statute was to prevent indigent "oakies" from
moving into California and overburdening California's welfare
rolls. 22 The Edwards decision, finding its basis in the interstate commerce clause, did not clarify the nature of the right to travel.2
16. Id. at 39.
17. 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941).
18. Id. at 184.
19. Id.
20. Law of May 25, 1937, ch. 369, § 2615, [19371 Cal. Laws 37 (repealed 1951).
21. 314 U.S. at 177.
22. "The State assert[ed] that the huge influx of migrants into California in recent years has resulted in problems of. . .finance, the proportions of which are staggering." Id. at 173.
23. This is so because the majority based its decision on the commerce
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However, when viewed in light of the facts presented, the decision
does support the proposition that the right to travel includes the
right to migrate and settle since the state did not object to the right
of indigents to pass through the state. Rather, it objected to their
right to migrate and settle in the state because they threatened to'
further burden California's welfare rolls.2
Within the last five years, most litigation involving the right to
travel has been concerned with state or local ordinances which place
a residency requirement on a person's ability to enjoy either a constitutional right or a governmental service.2"
In Shapiro v. Thompson,"0 the appellant moved from Massachusetts to Connecticut and applied for state welfare two months later.
The relevant Connecticut statute required welfare applicants to
have resided in the state for at least one year.2" In striking down the
statute the Court held that the purpose of deterring the in-migration
of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one year waiting period. If a law has "no other purpose
. . .than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights .

. .

it [is]

patently unconstitutional." 8
In one respect Shapiro:bearsa great similarity to Edwards. The
legislative enactments in both were primarily concerned with protecting the public treasury from new indigent demands. Although
clause. But see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-86 (Douglas &
Jackson, J.J., concurring).
24. However, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion in
Edwards in which he obviated the need for such a complex reading of the
case by urging the Court to "hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship . . . to enter any state of the Union, either for temporary sojourn or
for the establishment of permanent residence .
"Id. at 183 (Jackson,

J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)

(receipt of free medical benefits conditioned on residency); Dunn v. Blum-

stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting conditioned on residency); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (receipt of welfare benefits conditioned on
residency).
26. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27.

CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §

17-2d (Supp. 1974).

28. 394 U.S. at 631, quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
581 (1968).
29. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text. This similarity supports the proposition that the Edwards decision was in fact concerned with
the right to travel.
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the legislative methods differed, 3 both sought to restrict the influx
of indigents.
Shapiro reveals two important aspects of the right to travel. First,
that the Court will jealously guard an individual's right to travel in
much the same way it protects one's right to free speech. Thus, it
will strike down any state law which serves to "chill" a citizen's
right to travel. 3 Second, where a state denies or penalizes inmigration, it "chills" a constitutional right. 32 Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that there is a constitutional right to inmigration.
The Court recently decided the case of Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County,3 where an indigent resident of the county was
admitted to a private hospital for non-emergency medical care. The
hospital requested the transfer of the patient to the county hospital
and the reimbursement of all costs incurred in his treatment. The
county refused, relying on a state statute which conditioned the
receipt of free medical care on twelve months residence in the
county. 34 The Court held that the statute "impinges on the right of
interstate travel by denying newcomers 'basic necessities of life.'"-,
The Court clearly recognized a constitutional right to migrate and
settle, stating that "[t]he state['s] . . . durational residency requirement for free medical care penalizes indigents for exercising
3
their right to migrate to and settle in that state.
These decisions indicate that the right to migrate and settle
within the United States is a constitutionally protected right. However, a question arises as to the appropriateness of applying the
right to travel test in Petaluma. In the cases examined above, the
newly-arrived non-resident was penalized, while the resident was
not affected. 37 The Petaluma Plan does not discriminate between
30. In Edwards, any party found to have transported an indigent into
California was subject to criminal sanctions, whereas in Shapirothe newly
arrived indigent was denied welfare benefits. 394 U.S. at 622 n.2.
31. Id. at 631.
32. Id.
33. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
34. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-297(A) (Supp. 1974).
35. 415 U.S. at 269.
36. Id. at 261-62.
37. See notes 16-36 supra and accompanying text.
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the non-resident and the resident, but applies to both. It attempts
to limit population through zoning restrictions. For this reason, traditional zoning law concepts should be considered when evaluating
the Petaluma Plan.
Zoning ordinances, enacted pursuant to a state's police power,
have been accorded every presumption in favor of their validity."
This principle was set forth in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,39 which
was the first zoning case presented to the Supreme Court.40
In Euclid, the plaintiff held a parcel of land several years for
industrial uses." .A substantial portion of the plaintiff's land was
rezoned to exclude any proposed manufacturing or industrial development. 2 The Supreme Court found that no fundamental right was
involved in this type of zoning ordinance.43 In upholding the ordinance, the Court concluded that:
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional .

. .

such provisions

[must be] clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
Thus, the Court erected a substantial barrier around zoning ordinances, effectively shielding them from constitutional attack.,5
38. See Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
40. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND HOUSING INTHE 1970's 25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK
& BOSSELMAN].

41.

272 U.S. at 384.

42. "The entire area of the village is divided by the ordinance into six
classes of use districts, denominated U-1 to U-6. . . ." Id. at 380. "Appel-

lee's tract of land comes under U-2, U-3 and U-6." Id. at 382. Only in that
portion of Ambler's land zones U-6 was the development envisioned by
Ambler permitted. Id. at 380-81.
43. It is interesting that the Court exposed itself to a panoply of factors
in arriving at this decision when it expressly took note of all "the complex
conditions of our day. . . ." Id. at 387. This was a very broad statement

by the Court which indicates that it may take notice of regional factors in
determining whether or not an ordinance has a substantial relation to the
general welfare and still functions within the theoretical framework of

Euclid. Id. at 397.
44.

Id. at 395.

45.

Sager, Tight Little Islands:Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,

and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 783 (1969).
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Recently, "phased zoning" has been utilized as a tool for population control." The ordinances enacted in Ramapo, New York and
in Petaluma, California provide examples of such zoning plans. The
Ramapo ordinance limited the number of new housing permits to
be issued each year." In Golden v. PlanningBoard of Ramapo," the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the phased growth policies of
Ramapo," but made clear that the decision was to be narrowly and
closely limited to the facts of the case. 0
Ramapo successfully convinced the court that its growth policies
were aimed at population assimilation and not at exclusion." Thus,
Ramapo and Petaluma can be distinguished, for in the latter case
the court found as a fact that "[tihe city council intended in enacting the 'Petaluma Plan' to limit Petaluma's demographic and market growth rate in housing and in the immigration of new residents."5 The Petaluma court concluded that, there being no shortage of municipal facilities, the growth limitation was designed
solely to allow Petaluma to exclude prospective residents. The majority in Ramapo found that the municipality was straining at the
limits of its facilities," and that the effect of the ordinance, 4 as well
as its purpose,5 5 was to provide for orderly future growth. Therefore
the court in Ramapo held that there was a rational basis for phased
46.

Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAw &
298 (1955).
47. This was accomplished by making building permits "a function of
immediate availability to the proposed plat of certain municipal improvements .... ." Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 368, 285 N.E.2d 291,
295, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 144, appeal dismissed for want of substantialfederal question, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), noted in 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 516
(1972).
48. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed for want of substantialfederal question,
409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
49. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
52. 375 F.Supp. at 576.
53. 30 N.Y.2d at 366 n.1, 285 N.E.2d at 294 n.1, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142
n.1.
54. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
55. Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53.
CONTEMP. PROB.

144-

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. III

growth.-" Significantly, these findings were lacking in Petaluma."
The Petaluma court looked to Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases
which dealt with zoning statutes requiring that new residences be
built on lots with a large minimum lot size. Although these cases
dealt with lot size 58 and not phased growth, they were viewed in
Petaluma as highly persuasive. 9 The case representative of this line
of decisions and most similar to Petaluma is Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc.60 Appellant contracted to purchase 140 acres from a
third party providing the land was rezoned to one acre single family
lots. The municipality zoned the land for a minimum lot size of two
to three acres. The city argued that such rezoning was necessary
because a problem existed with regard to the town's sewer system
and that the lower population level and density brought about by
larger lots would ameliorate the problem.' Finding this unacceptable, the court concluded:
We once again reaffirm our past authority and refuse to allow the township
to do precisely what we have never permitted-keep out people, rather than
make community improvements. . .. [C]ommunities must deal with the
problems of population growth. They may not refuse to confront the future
by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict population to near
present levels."2
56. Id. at 383, 285.N.E.2d at 304-05,-334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
57. The Petaluma court found that "[tihe city [was] able . . . to
return to absorption of existing market and demographic growth rates
without exceeding the capacity of city facilities." 375 F. Supp. at 578. The
court also found that the Petaluma plan intentionally limited the growth
rate of the city so as not to provide for the absorption of expected population increases. Id. at 576.
58. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970);
National Land & Inv. Co. v: Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966); Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958); cf.
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). In Girsh, a local zoning
plan which did not provide for apartment houses was invalidated by the
court. While the doctrinal basis for this decision is not clear, the court
expressed a view similar to that found in Petaluma when it found that "if
[the locality in question] ...is a logical place for development to take
place, it should not be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part of
the burden." Id. at 245, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
59. 375 F. Supp. at 584.
60. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
61. Id. at 472 & n.5, 268 A.2d at 767 & n.5.
62. Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768.
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In comparison, Petaluma applied the fundamental constitutional
right to travel and refused to allow a municipality to zone out
growth.

3

The present system of zoning law can provide the judiciary with
the degree of flexibility necessary in zoning cases, and lift zoning law
4
out of the 1920s into the latter half of the twentieth century.
A basic tenet of zoning law is that the municipality is an entity
unto itself, 5 largely independent of the world around it. In contemporary America, however, population growth produces problems on
a multi-state or regional scale. This growth has already created a
megalopolis from New Hampshire to Virginia,"6 and more megalopoli may be developing. 7 There is an intricate economic relationship between a city and its surrounding suburbs, 8 coupled with an
increasingly more complex intermingling between entire metropolitan regions. 9 In short, traditional concepts of self-contained munici63. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
64. This modernizing role of the courts was recognized and encouraged
by Babcock and Bosselman when they wrote that "[t]he most important
role of the courts

. . .

is to act as a predicate to legislative reform. The

courts can dramatize the absurdities and inequities in a fractured system
of governmental regulation designed for a quieter era, and create a real
pressure for reform." BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN 38.
65. Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of
Land Development, 26 STAN. L. Rzv. 585, 605 (1974).
66. This term was coined by geographer Jean Gottmann. It describes
the area along the northeastern seaboard of the United States extending
from New Hampshire to Virginia. The need for a special term was perceived when it was seen, in examining the New Hampshire to Virginia
area, that, "[iln the geography of the distribution of habitat this was a
phenomenon unique . . . in the world. It resulted obviously from the coalescence recently achieved, of a chain of metropolitan areas . . . ." Gott-

man, Megalopolis, or the Urbanizationof the Northeastern Seaboard, in
READINGS IN URBAN GEOGRAPHY 46 (H. Mayer & C. Kohn ed. 1959).
67. "A vast urban and suburban area is rapidly expanding around Los
Angeles for instance .

. .

. Around Chicago, on the shore of Lake Michi-

gan, another impressive urban community is shaping. The metropolitan
areas stretching in Ohio between Cleveland and Pittsburgh are close to
coalescence." Id.
68. See generally Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use
Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 51(5, 535 (1957).

69.

See generally Isard & Kavesh, Economic StructuralInterrelations

146 -
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palities are anachronistic,"0 and must be abandoned.
The need for courts to weigh regional zoning considerations was
recognized by Euclid' as early as 1926. While discussing the powers
of a municipality to zone, the Court cautioned:
It is not meant by this [discussion of the municipality's power], however,
to exclude the p6ssibility of cases where the general public interest would so
far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not
be allowed to stand in the way."

The basic principles of zoning law set forth in Euclid tipped the
scales against regional interests.73 As a consequence, few cases utilize a regional approach when deciding whether a zoning ordinance
bears a reasonable relation to the general welfare.74
In Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett,7" the court used a regional

approach to uphold an exclusionary ordinance. Appellee sand company was the owner of a tract of land within the appellant's borders.
It wished to remove sand from the property for use in its business,
but was prevented by a village ordinance which zoned the entire
village for residential redevelopment. The issue was whether a municipality could validly adopt an ordinance which zones an entire
of Metropolitan Regions, in READINGS IN URBAN GEOGRAPHY 116 (H. Mayer
& C. Kohn ed. 1959).
70. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418
(6th Cir. 1955); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 374, 285 N.E.2d
291, 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149 (1972), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
71. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see
notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 390.
73. BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN 26-27.
74. See, e.g., Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider Regional Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REV. 244, 247 nn.17-38
(1971). These cases group themselves into three categories: those cases in
which the courts have used the character of the region to uphold exclusionary ordinances; those cases where the courts took cognizance of the character of land use beyond the municipal boundary so that they might justly
resolve the incompatible zoning of two contiguous use districts lying along,
a common municipal boundary; and, instances wherein courts have placed
an affirmative obligation on a municipality to zone for the good of the
region in which it is located.
75. 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
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municipality into a single use district. In upholding the ordinance,"6
the court placed great weight on regional factors:
Traditional concepts of zoning envision a municipality as a self-contained
community with its own residential business and industrial areas. It is
obvious that Valley View, Ohio, on the periphery of a large metropolitan
center, is not such a self-contained community, but only an adventitious
fragment of the economic and social whole."

Taking into account those factors beyond the municipal boundary,
the court concluded that the town could zone the entire municipality
residential use.
IAforyear
before Valley View was decided, the Supreme
Court of
Illinois had taken a regional approach to a zoning conflict in La
Salle NationalBank v. City of Chicago." Plaintiff bank desired to
develop certain property into a shopping center. Chicago had first
zoned the property for apartment house use, and then for single
family residential use. The character of the surrounding community, both inside and outside the municipal boundary, was entirely residential. The bank contended that a nearby housing project
was in another municipality and that the court should not take
cognizance of its existence in determining the ordinance's validity.7"
Disagreeing, the court upheld Chicago's action, and considered the
character of the community beyond the municipal boundary, finding that the validity of an ordinance depends on "existing conditions and not . . . geographical and territorial limits or . . .the
powers of neighboring municipalities."'"
The same regional approach has been used in cases involving
incompatibly zoned areas which have a common border. This was
the problem which faced a New Jersey court in Borough of Creskill
v. Borough of Dumont." Dumont wished to zone land lying along
its municipal boundary for non-residential development. The neigh76. Id. at 418.
77. Id. See also Duffcon Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J.
509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949); Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11 N.J.
Super. 405, 78 A.2d 435 (App. Div. 1951).
78. 4 Ill. 2d 253, 122 N.E.2d 519 (1954).
79. Id. at 257, 122 N.E.2d at 522.

80. Id. at 257, 122 N.E.2d at 522, quoting Hannifin Corp. v. Berwyn, 1
Ill. 2d 28, 36, 115 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1953).
81. 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (Super. Ct. 1953).
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boring municipality objected, as it had zoned the part of its land
sharing the common boundary for residential use. Cresskill contended that its neighbor must take into account the nature of the
land adjacent to its boundary when enacting zoning ordinances. The
court agreed:
The public health, morals and welfare are not limited by the boundaries of
any particular zoning district, nor even by the boundaries of the municipality
adopting the ordinance. [The restrictions and regulations in a zoning ordinance]... must be made with reasonable consideration ...to the character
of the neighborhood lying along the border of the municipality adopting the
ordinance.s

In Simon v. Town of Needham," the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts placed an affirmative duty on a municipality to consider regional needs when zoning. Needham, a suburb of Boston,
had a steadily increasing population,"4 and demand for new houses
was steady." In view of the growth potential of the town, petitioners
contracted to purchase a parcel of land located in zoning district A.
The petitioner's development plan called for the 24.5 acre site to be
subdivided into fifty-eight lots. One month later, Needham
amended its zoning ordinance to provide for a minimum lot size of
one acre in zoning district A." While the court upheld the ordinance, it clearly expressed the role which regional considerations
should have in determining the validity of an ordinance. The court
opined that lot size "was to be determined not only in the light of
present needs of the public but also with a view to the probable
requirements of the public that would arise in the immediate future
... ,,sThis suggests that a zoning plan must insure the municipality's ability to accommodate those who will migrate to the town
82. Id. at 42-43, 100 A.2d at 191. See also Schwartz v. Congregation
Powolei Zeduck, 8 Ill. App. 2d 438, 131 N.E.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1956), where
the court concluded that "[tihe development of one zoning district may
be in part regulated by the character of the adjacent district. In fact, it is
not unreasonable to base zoning regulations for one municipality upon the
conditions . . .of an adjoining municipality . . ." Id. at 440-41, 131
N.E.2d at 786.
83. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
84. Id. at 560-61, 42 N.E.2d at 517.
85. Id. at 562, 42 N.E.2d at 517.
86. Id. at 561, 42 N.E.2d at 517.
87. Id. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
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in the future. Citing Euclid, the Simon court spoke of this obligation
as follows:
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up a barrier
against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens who desire to live there
.... The strictly local interests of the town must yield if it appears that they
are plainly in conflict with the general interests of the public at large. .... U

More recently, some local zoning authorities have looked upon
mobile home sites with disfavor and have passed ordinances excluding such sites entirely or severely hampering their growth.8 These
mobile homes provide adequate housing quickly and economically."
Some courts have recognized the role of mobile homes and have
invalidated local zoning ordinances which restricted them, concluding that the ordinances were not designed to promote the general
welfare if they ignored regional housing needs." In effect, these
courts have imposed upon municipalities an affirmative duty to
accept their fair share of the population growth of a region.
Courts are not alone in their concern with the need for regional
planning. Several state legislatures have established regional plan88. Id. at 565-66, 42 N.E.2d at 519. See also Oakwood at Madison,. Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Super. Ct.
1971), in which a New Jersey court invalidated a zoning ordinance which
attempted to phase growth, finding that "[iln pursuing the valid zoning
purpose of a balanced community, a municipality must not ignore. . . its
fair proportion of the obligation to meet the housing needs of its own
population and of the region.... The general welfare does not stop at each
municipal boundary." Id. at 20, 283 A.2d at 358.
89. See, e.g., the ordinances in Lakeland Bluffs, Inc. v. County of Will,
114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1969); Bristow v. City of
Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1971).
90. Comment, The Presumption of Validity of Mobile Homes As a
Preferred Use, 7 URBAN L. ANNUAL 296, 300 (1974).
91.' Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322
(Ct. App. 1971). Here, the plaintiff owned farm land and contracted to sell
it to a third party who had plans to develop a mobile home park. A zoning
variance was applied for and denied. In holding that the mobile home park
must be allowed, the court cited with approval the Illinois Court of
Appeals to the effect that "[w]here certain land uses are concerned the
term 'general welfare' must be defined to meet the exigencies caused by
urbanized society." Id. at 217 n.6, 192 N.W.2d at 328 n.6, citing Lakeland Bluffs, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 269, 252 N.E.2d
765, 770 (Ct. App. 1969).
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ning commissions or agencies. 2 Hopefully, these regional commissions will find viable solutions to such demographic problems as
posed in Petaluma.
The Petalumacourt has authoritative support for invalidating the
Petaluma Plan on the ground that it unreasonably penalized the
constitutionally protected right to migrate and settle.9 3 However,
using the right to travel to invalidate a local zoning ordinance appears to be unwise. First, the right to trAvel may not apply in
Petaluma.4 Furthermore, the right to travel test sets too high and
inflexible a standard for local zoning ordinances to meet. If this test
.gains widespread judicial acceptance, many zoning laws will be
struck down with nothing to replace them. Finally, a test such as
the one used in Petaluma restrains a court from considering regional
factors which must be considered in today's complex and interrelated society. This result obtains because under the right to travel
test the operative facts considered by a court need not include regional factors. 5 Thus it would be possible for a court to decide a case
without ever addressing itself to the needs of the region of which the
municipality is a part.
Lane J. Genatowski
92. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65600 (West Supp. 1974) (authorizing
area planning); id. §§ 65650-51 (authorizing two or more municipalities to
take joint action on a zoning dispute when necessary); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-31a (1974 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 160.02 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 45-22. 1-1 (1971) (in recognition of the need for regional planning,
this law provides for a Joint Municipal Planning Commission).
93. See notes 10-42 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 16-42 supra and accompanying text.
95. The reason for this is that the only question under the right to
travel test is whether or not an ordinance chills a person's right to migrate
into the enacting jurisdiction. The character of the surrounding area and
the effect upon it by an ordinance (though relevant under a general welfare
of the region test) are considerations which do not aid a court in applying
a right to travel test and therefore could be excluded from a court's attention.

